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Introduction
Married men receive higher wages than unmarried. Whereas this marital wage premium (MWP) has been shown in basically every country study, the existence of a cohabiting wage premium (CWP) is not so evident, yet. According to the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) e.g., a man who got married in the preceding year receives a 13 percent higher wage rate than a man who stayed single (Barg / Beblo 2007) . Based on the same data set, moving in with a partner leads to a comparatively smaller premium of 6.7 percent in the subsequent year. 1 In this paper we exploit the observed difference between the cohabiting and the marital wage premium to draw conclusions about their respective sources (specialization versus selection). A second and related question concerns the relative importance of the legal framework for marriage and cohabitation on couples' time use arrangements.
Regarding the sources of the MWP, we can distinguish two main hypotheses in the literature: the specialization or productivity hypothesis and the selection hypothesis. 2 The specialization hypothesis postulates that married men tend to have more time and energy to invest in their job than unmarried men because their wives can "back them up" on all remaining chores. Traditional division of household responsibilities between husbands and wives makes married women take over the main part of household production, including child rearing, and gives their spouses the chance to be more productive in the labor market (Becker 1985) . This reasoning includes a potentially higher sense of responsibility of married men to take care for their families financially. Empirical evidence for the specialization hypothesis is provided among others by Kenny (1983) who concludes that married men accumulate human capital more rapidly, as well as Korenman and Neumark 1 Both averages are based on data from the interview years 1994 to 2005 and refer to dependently employed men (only private sector for the married). 2 Alternative explanations for the MWP, yet more difficult to distinguish empirically from the mentioned two, include employer favoritism for married employees (Hill 1979) and compensating wage differentials where married men have higher wages because they take jobs with fewer amenities and non-pecuniary rewards (Reed / Harford 1989) .
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(1991), whose results based on a US company personnel file show a faster wage growth after marriage. By integrating the wife's labour market hours in the analysis, Chun and Lee's study (2001) reveals marriage wage gains to be explained by the degree of specialization within the household. Antonovics and Town (2004) uncover a MWP even for monozygotic twins. Kermit (1992) presents evidence that marriage makes men more productive as the input of the spouse's time enhances productivity augmentation. A study by Mamun (2005) provides empirical support for intra-household spillover effects of the partner's education.
The second explanation for the MWP proceeds on the assumption that men with higher (potential) wages are more likely to get married than men with lower income prospects.
This selection can work either directly through women preferring men with higher wages or indirectly through characteristics that are valuable for both, the marriage market and the labor market (Becker, 1981) . Empirical evidence for selection to explain at least part of the wage premium can be found in Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997) , Breusch and Gray (2004) , Datta Gupta, Smith and Stratton (2005) , Ginther and Zavodny (2001) . According to Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997) , US men with higher earnings are more likely to marry and less likely to divorce. Using Australian data Breusch and Gray (2004) find similar wage levels for married and cohabiting men but higher earnings for ex-married in comparison to never-married men. According to Datta Gupta, Smith and Stratton (2005) the marital premium diminishes after controlling for individual fixed effects -another support for the selection hypothesis. However, by focussing on shotgun weddings, which they assume to be uncorrelated with earnings ability Ginther and Zavodny (2001) find little evidence for selection.
In view of these rather heterogeneous research results on its sources, the MWP seems to have remained a puzzle in the economic literature. Our paper provides further pieces to solve this puzzle. We start with the question, whether the selection and specialization hypotheses apply to cohabiting couples in the same way as they work for married. On one hand, it could be argued, that both selection and specialization should be prevalent at the men who stay unmarried all through from year (t-1) to year (t+1). By holding constant characteristics that might have an impact on both, a man's hourly wage rate as well as his likelihood to get married, we take account of the possible selection of men with high wages into marriage. In this first matching model we hope to detect how much of the MWP can be attributed to the selection hypothesis.
To have a comparative measure of the MWP between married and cohabiting men, we set up a second sampling and matching procedure accordingly. Assuming that potential selection into a relationship and household specialization should apply to married as well as cohabiting men and in light of the different legal treatment of marriage and cohabitation, we expect the wage difference between married men and cohabiters to be of much smaller, but still remarkable, size than the wage difference between married and single men.
In a third matching model we assess the size of the selection effect at the time of moving in with a partner (either instead of or prior to getting married legally). Here we use the shifting-panel window on move-ins in the GSOEP between 1993 and 2004. Men who report to live in the same household as their partner for the first time in the reference year (t) and still do so in t+1 are matched with single men who live alone all through from year (t-1) to year (t+1). This way, we also take account of the possible selection of men with high wage potentials into cohabitation.
In the next Section we describe potentially wage-related legal differences between married and cohabiting couples in Germany. The econometric matching approach is laid out in the third section, followed by a description of our data sampling procedure in Section 4.
Empirical results on the propensity score estimations and the matched wage differentials of married versus single men and married versus cohabiting men are presented in Sections 5
and 6. In the latter we also compare time use decisions of married and cohabiting couples.
The last Section discusses caveats and possible extensions of our approach.
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Legal differences
As in most countries, cohabitation and marriage have different legal status in Germany.
Particularly the incentives for married and cohabiting couples to engage in intra-household specialization of time use are expected to vary with institutional settings such as joint taxation of married couples or the coverage of a non-employed spouse within the wage earner's public health insurance. Joint taxation of married couples combined with a tax allowance for each partner creates a greater economic incentive for married to specialize in a breadwinner-housewife-type model (or vice versa) than for cohabiting couples. Hence, specialization should be more prevalent in married couples and, as a result, we might expect the MWP to be larger than the CWP. Coverage of the marital partner in the public health insurance provides a similar immediate effect for more specialization within married than cohabiting couples. In comparison, the law for widows' or widowers' pensions creates rather long-term returns, as only married are entitled and thus may be willing to engage in intra-household specialization in view of future compensation (see Table 1 ). Other indirect effects leading the MWP to outrage the CWP are created by the regulations for maintenance payments after split up, where the splitting cohabiter is only entitled to receive maintenance support if he or she sacrifices employment for a raising a common child under 3 years of age, and lower dissolution costs for cohabiting couples. As a result, cohabiters may face a lower commitment level which translates into a shorter expected duration of the relationship and, thus, less specialization (as this is a more risky investment for a nonmarried partner who specializes in housekeeping).
The above-mentioned legal differences between married and cohabiting couples in Germany are listed in Table 1 . The fourth column concludes states whether they are related -directly or indirectly -to the size of a potential wage premium. 
Matching approach
The simplest way to assess the wage effect of being married 5 would be to compare the wage rates of married and non-married. This would be a valid approach if married men formed a randomly selected subgroup of all men. However, in face of an observed MWP and according to the selection and specialization hypotheses, individuals neither sort randomly into marriage nor are they equally affected by marriage. Instead, a selection bias may emerge if the likelihood of marriage is related to the wage rate. If men with more favorable labor market characteristics (i.e. who are more likely to experience wage growth)
are also more attractive to women as potential mates, the true wage differential between married and non-married will be overestimated. In this way, our research question may be interpreted as a classical evaluation problem, where counterfactual outcomes are to be estimated in order to assess the true wage premium of marriage.
To produce a credible estimate of this counterfactual or hypothetical outcome, we apply the method of matching which identifies the causal effect of a "treatment" by comparing the wage rate of a married man with the wage rate that would have been realized, had that same man stayed unmarried (Rubin 1974) . This yields the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), an estimate of the average expected effect of marriage on the wage rate for all men who are marrying.
Let Y 1i denote the wage rate of a man one year after marriage and let Y 0i denote the wage rate of a man who stays unmarried. Then, the ATT is given by:
where D i is an indicator variable which equals one if person i is married and equals zero otherwise.
As the hypothetical wage outcome ) 1
e. of a married man not being married)
cannot be observed, we have to refer to wages of unmarried but otherwise similar men.
According to the Conditional Mean Independence Assumption (CMIA) (Rosenbaum / Rubin 1983) , Y 0 is the same for treated and untreated individuals in expectation, if we control for differences in observable characteristics X:
Hence, if we assume that selection into marriage is taken up by this set of individual characteristics, any remaining difference between treated and non-treated individuals can be attributed to the effect of marriage. By conditioning on X, we can select the appropriate control group of non-treated, i.e. non-married, men by means of propensity score matching where every person in the treatment group (married) is matched to a comparable control 8 9 person from the non-treated group (non-married). The vector X includes all variables available that presumably affect the event of marriage while having an influence on the wage level as well.
The first step in selecting comparable individuals, therefore, is to estimate a Probit model of getting married and derive the corresponding propensity score (PS). The intuition behind the PS matching is that individuals with the same probability of "treatment" can be paired for purpose of comparison. In our setting, it describes the likelihood of getting married (or moving in with a partner) in the following year for every man in the sample. In the next step, married men are matched to unmarried based on their estimated probability of belonging to the treatment group, given by the distance metric PS = P(X) (Rosenbaum / Rubin 1983) . We apply nearest neighbor matching with replacement, where for each married man that one non-married man with the closest PS is selected. 
Data sampling
The data used for our analysis are based on data from several waves of the German SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a yearly micro-data panel which has been conducted in annual interviews of individuals and households since 1984 in West Germany and since 1990 in East Germany.
7 It is best suited for our analysis as it contains information on wage income and various individual characteristics that are likely to affect marriage prospects and labor market outcome at the same time. Non-married participants in the survey provide information about their living circumstances, such as whether they live alone or with a partner. Moreover, this information is available over a long period of time which enables us to gather a decent number of respondents who experience a marriage or move-in within the observation period.
6 A detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different PS matching algorithms can be found in Imbens (2004) . 7 For a detailed description of the data set see SOEP Group (2001) . Likewise, all men who remain unmarried during the corresponding 3-year window (that is, from t-1 to t+1 around the sample year) qualify for the control groups. There is one control group of singles who report not to live with a partner in either of the years t-1, t or t+1 and another control group of cohabiters who live together with a spouse during that same time period. Divorcees and widowers are not considered in either of the groups. Thus, the first treatment group consists of men who are married in t for the first time and the control groups are formed by men who have never been married in their lives, at least up to t+1.
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Our second treatment group ("move-in") includes all those who report to live with a partner in the same household in t and t+1, but did not so in t-1. Naturally, we compare the wages of this second treatment group only to the control group of singles.
In total, by focusing on marriages between 1993 and 2004, we make use of GSOEP data from the years 1992 to 2005. The total number of men marrying over the twelve-year 10 observation period and matching our sampling criteria is 364, the corresponding number of men who move in with a partner is 219. The applied sampling criteria and the remaining numbers of respondents at each step of the sampling procedure are listed in Table 2 . Naturally, we consider only men who fall in one of the observation (treatment or control) groups. As our analysis relies on reliable information on individual market wages, we have to restrict our sample to dependent employees and ignore all self-employed, unemployed, students, trainees and individuals in special training programs or national services (military and civil) at the time of the wage comparison (t+1). Another restriction for the married sub-sample regards private-sector employees since paying schemes in the public sector are set up with a build-in marriage premium already, which would bias our results substantially. 9 Finally, we consider only 12 employees who report a positive number of contractual working hours per week and positive monthly gross earnings before (t-1) and after (t+1) the reference year. After applying these criteria we are left with observations from 5,526 men, 364 of whom get married, 219 move in with a partner, 3,772 live as singles and 1,220 cohabit.
As hourly wage rates are not observed directly, we construct this variable by dividing current monthly gross wage earnings by the contractual number of working hours. 
Propensity Score Estimation
Three Probit models are estimated, one for married and single men, one including married and cohabiting and the third one for those who move in versus staying single. According to the CMIA (that selection into marriage/cohabitation is taken up by this set of individual characteristics and any remaining wage difference between treated and non-treated individuals can be attributed to the effect of marriage/cohabitation), the models include explanatory variables on characteristics one year before marriage (t-1) that are assumed to have an influence on both, the propensity to marry as well as the wage level. Due to the longitudinal perspective of our analysis, our choice of variables that might serve as conditioning characteristics for the matching of married/cohabiting and unmarried men is limited. We are restricted to variables gathered every single year over the whole period from 1992 to 2003 (time of matching, t-1). Given, that the numbers of men in our treatment groups are already very limited, we choose that set of variables for the propensity score estimation that allows us to keep the maximum number of observations for the matching 10 As wage income variable we use the generated variable labgro$$ provided in the GSOEP.
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procedures while leaving a large enough scope for the CMIA to hold. Most importantly, and as part of the socio-economic variables, we use the before-marriage wage rate in t-1. It is meant to cover unobserved factors that may drive a man's earnings potential and, potentially, his attractiveness as a spouse at the same time. To summarize, we distinguish two sets of variables:
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• Socio-economic characteristics such as age, education, occupational status, tenure, type of job contract, region, nationality, migration status, children and the wage level at t-1.
• Satisfaction and concern variables such as satisfaction with several aspects of life (health, income, housing situation, leisure etc.) as well as life in general and concerns about the own and the general economic situation.
The means and standard deviations of all variables included in the PS estimations are given separately for the treated men (married and move-ins) and the control groups (single and cohabiting) in Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix. The estimation results of the Probit models for all three matching procedures are presented in Table 3 
Matching Results
In the first matching procedure (matching I), an adequate control person for each married man is selected among the singles. The results are presented in Table 4 :
The average wage rate of a married man is 15.91 € whereas the unmatched wage of a single amounts to 14.08 € on average. This yields a significant unmatched wage gap of about 1.83 € or 13 percent. After controlling for differences in observed characteristics, the adjusted wage rate of singles rises towards the level of the married (15.70 €). The wage differential falls to 21 cents and is not statistically significantly different from zero any more.
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Interpreting this ATT of 1.34 percent, a randomly chosen man from the sample of married would not receive a lower wage if he were not married. This result confirms that high-wage men with better paid socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics (particularly higher starting wages) are more likely to marry. Hence, when comparing married to single men, the MWP seems to be fully attributable to a selection process into marriage. Table 3 and Stata matching algorithm psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) . GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. Bold numbers indicate a significance level of 5%.
Matching II, of married and cohabiting men, yields slightly different results (see Table 5 ).
Without controlling for differences in observed covariates, married out-earn cohabiters by only 68 cents on average. Moreover, this unmatched MWP is not statistically different from zero at standard levels. Table 3 and Stata matching algorithm psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) . GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. Bold numbers indicate a significance level of 5%.
After balancing the samples with respect to observable characteristics the differential decreases even further to 23 cents, that is, an ATT of 1.47 percent which is also not statistically significant. 13 The matched wage rate of cohabiters rises to 15.68 € indicating that, if
anything, within the sample of married and cohabiting men those with a higher paying mix of socio-economic and/or attitudinal characteristics tend to get married. A randomly chosen man from the sample of married would not have received a different wage if he had not married and remained cohabiting.
In Matching III we now compare wages of men who have recently moved in with their partner with those of men who stayed living alone (see Table 6 ). The results are similar to the findings of Matching I: Move-ins have an average wage rate of 15.01 € and the group of unmatched singles receives 14.08 €. Although this observed CWP is smaller than the raw MWP, it still amounts to significant 0.94 € or 6.7 percent. After controlling for differences in observed characteristics, the wage differential is only 36 cents and not statistically significant anymore. 14 Interpreting this ATT of hardly 5 percent, a randomly chosen man from the sample of cohabiters would not receive a lower wage if he had not moved in with his partner. This result confirms that high-wage men with better paid socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics (particularly higher starting wages) are not only more likely to marry but also to cohabit without being legally married. Hence, also the CWP seems to be fully attributable to a selection process into cohabitation. Table 3 and Stata matching algorithm psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) . GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. Bold numbers indicate a significance level of 5%.
We may conclude that our econometric results are in strong favor of the selection instead of the specialization hypothesis. 15 On one hand, and as regards the comparison of married and cohabiting couples in particular, one might have expected specialization effects to be of minor importance today. On the other hand, and as we described earlier, institutions in Germany such as joint taxation of married couples, public health insurance coverage and pension regulations provide incentives for intra-household specialization for married couples only. In fact, if we take a closer look at the post-matching time use decisions at t+1 within the couples of our matching sample II, the percentage of men whose spouses are not gainfully employed is significantly higher among the married than among the cohabiting men -33 compared to 13 percent (see Table 7 ). Likewise, the intra-household difference in working hours (in gainful employment) among married couples more than doubles the difference within cohabiting couples. Married men spend less time on child care and household work than their spouses. The difference is 4.4, respectively 1.9 hours and thereby significantly larger than that between cohabiting women and men. At the same time, married men more often live with a child in the household than cohabiters. Although we do not observe any difference in part-time employment, we interpret these findings as evidence for intra-household time use decisions to differ depending on the legal status of the relationship. 16 However, as neither the MWP nor the CWP proved to be significant once we conditioned on observable characteristics in our matching models, these traces of specialization should not be interpreted as a causal factor for a wage premium but, instead, as being one part of the selection process from single via cohabitation to marriage. 
Discussion
Recently married men in Germany receive on average 13 percent higher wages than single and 4.5 percent higher wages than cohabiting men. With PS matching we can show that the average treatment effect of marriage for the married is not statistically significant. In other words, married men have higher wages because they have a more favorable mix of characteristics, even before marriage, and high-income men with a higher wage potential are more likely to get married. This result in support of the selection hypothesis is particularly convincing in light of the virtually non-existing wage differential between married and cohabiting men. There seems to be a selection process into living together with somebody regardless of the legal status. By investigating the premium for cohabitation, our analysis provides even further support for this conclusion: men who moved in with their partner receive 6.7 percent higher wages than singles on average. Matching reveals that also this premium can be fully attributed to selection. Although we find intra-household specialization to be more prevalent in married than in cohabiting couples, just as suggested by the differences in the legal framework, this does not show off in a wage premium, once we condition on observed characteristics. We conclude that specialization should not be interpreted as a causal factor for a wage premium but as being part of the selection process from single via cohabitation to marriage.
Though we think the application of a non-parametric estimation method within the context of marriage and wages the most promising way to go, there are still a few caveats to overcome and possible extensions to be mentioned: First, our analysis focuses on men who are employed prior to marriage (respectively the reference year) and does not include marrying students, unemployed etc. which may give rise to additional selection. As marriage has been shown to be positively related to job security, we argue that this possible selection bias would add even further to the positive selection effect investigated in the paper. Employed men may be more likely to marry and not (yet) employed men to 21 postpone marriage until their career has started. In this case, our results would even tend to underestimate the full selection effect.
Second, the sorting of men into marriage or cohabitation may be based on observable as well as unobservable characteristics. With regard to the effect of observables we hope to have covered most of the sorting process by applying non-parametric matching to married and non-married men conditional on a wide range of characteristics. However, men might be more likely to find a spouse not only because of their human capital and other observable endowments but because of other (unobserved) traits that affect both marriage and labor market outcome. As we argue above, at least part of this selection on unobservables will be taken care of, as long as it is related to earnings before marriage, by including the wage at t-1 into the propensity score estimation. A methodological alternative to our approach would be the application of a switching regression model, with endogenous marital selection that incorporates a covariance structure between unobserved earnings capabilities and unobserved traits valued by potential mates (following Chun and Lee 2001) . However this methodology builds on an appropriate exclusion restriction that is not easy to find in the existing data. 
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